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A New Law of Corporate Trade Names
GEORGE A. ROLSTON* and GERALD M. ADLER**

The rapid increase in the number of incorporations over the last
century raises problems as to the regulation of the corporate name
which were not envisaged a hundred years ago when the first general
legislation was introduced. Every lawyer is familiar with the difficulties of choosing a corporate name, and the problem of preserving
it from encroachment by others is, if anything, of still greater concern. These two questions are facets of the same basic problem,
namely, how far does the law protect an established company from
newcomers seeking to incorporate under the same or a similar name?
The recent case of Re The F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd., Ex parte
Chalpples Ltd.,1 throws a great deal of light on this problem, and
this article will be devoted to an examination of some of the broader
issues raised by this case. This was an application brought by
Chapples Ltd. under section 12 of the Ontario Corporations Act
1953,2 seeking an order that the respondent, The F. P. Chapple Co.
Ltd., should change its name to such other name as is deemed proper.
The facts were briefly that Chapples Ltd. was incorporated in
1911 and ever since had carried on a department store business in
Northern Ontario in Fort William and six other towns in the surrounding district and had acquired a considerable reputation in that district.
In 1954 a director of Chapples Ltd., one F. P. Chapple, the son of the
founder, started up a small dry goods store in Burlington, Ontario,
under the firm name and style Chapples Dry Goods, with the knowledge of the other directors. Later he opened a branch under the
same name in Bronte. In 1959 all of the shares of Chapples Ltd.
were sold to the Great Western Saddlery Co. Ltd. and F. P. Chapple
resigned as director. Shortly afterwards F. P. Chapple incorporated
a public company under the name The F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd. the
respondent company, which thereupon bought the business of Chapples
*Mr. Rolston took his first LL.B. at University College London, England in
1955 and was called to the bar by The Middle Temple in 1956 where he practiced until 1958 specializing in Patent and Trade Mark matters. In 1960 he
obtained an LL.B. from Osgoode Hall Law School and is presently working
under articles with the firm of Cavanagh & Norman.
"Mr. Adler was formerly a licentiate of The Chartered Auctioneers' &
Estate Agents' Institute, England and is presently in his first year at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 (1960), 33 C.P.R. p. 48 at first instance; [1960] O.R. p. 531. The name
of the company appears to be misquoted in several ways in the report, the
correct version being that shown above.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 71.
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Dry Goods, including the goodwill which was valued at $7,000. Thereafter, the dry goods business was expanded to the level of a "Junior"
Department Store, and the name on the store fronts changed to The
F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd. Department Store, with the words "The F. P."
and "Co. Ltd." being in very much smaller lettering than the three
principal words. There was a considerable volume of evidence, as to
the various different forms of lettering used both by the applicant
and th.3 respondent, over their various stores, and also as to the
various forms of advertising and letterhead employed, and a number
of affidavits showing the distinctiveness of the applicant Company's
name. There was also evidence of one case of actual confusion having
occured where some invoices for The F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd. were
sent to Chapples Ltd. It appears from the judgment of the trial
judge,3 Mr. Justice Stewart, that two actions were brought by
Chapples Ltd., one under section 12 of the Corporations Act and the
other for "passing off", the latter not having been proceeded with at
this point.
When this application came before him in December 1959 the
learned judge proceeded on the basis that the statute required him
simply to compare the two names and reach his own opinion as to
the likelihood of deception. On comparing the two names side by
side namely
The F. P. Chapple Company Limited
and
Chapples Limited
he decided that there was no likelihood of deception of "any intelligent person", and that accordingly the applicant had failed to discharge the onus upon it and the application must be dismissed. He
referred briefly to the considerable volume of evidence of the distinctiveness of the applicant's name and of the manner in which the
applicant and the respondent used their names and held that this
was irrelevant in an application under section 12, though it would,
of course, be important in a holding out (i.e., passing off) action.
On appeal the finding of Stewart J. was reversed and accordingly
an order was made referring the case back to Stewart J. with a
direction to change the name of the respondent to such name as he
deemed proper, the Court of Appeal (Porter, C.J.O., Gibson and
MacKay, J.J.A.) holding 4 that the words "likely to deceive" in
section 12 should be subjected to virtually the same tests as those
applied in a common law action for passing off.
This provision has seldom been judicially examined and indeed
only one prior application under this section was cited by counsel and
(1960), 33 C.P.R. 50.
(19601 O.R. at page 538. (The word NOT in line 21 having been deleted
in the next issue of the reports.)
3

4
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that resulted in the application being dismissed without any detailed
consideration of the principles to be applied.5
Accordingly it is of interest to examine the principles applied
by Stewart J. and by the Court of Appeal respectively, and any further
alternative avenues of approach to section 12, and also to consider
the purpose of this provision and whether this purpose is achieved.
To do this it will be helpful to give a brief summary of the common law of passing off by trade names, and of the statutory action
for passing off under section 7 of the Trade Marks Act 1953,6 and
then to examine the provisions of section 12 and corresponding company law provisions in other jurisdictions.
"PASSING OFF"

The Common Law

Action 7

The basic principles governing all types of passing off actions at

common law, whether by confusing trade marks, or confusing trade
names or otherwise, were summarized by Kay L. J. in Powell v.
Birmingham Vinegar Breweries Co.:8
"The law relating to this subject may be stated in a few propositions.
(1) It is unlawful for a trader to pass off his goods as the goods of
another.
(2) Even If this is done innocently it will be restrained.
(3) A fortiori if done designedly, for that is a fraud.
(4) Although the first purchaser is not deceived, if the article is so
delivered to him as to be calculated to deceive a purchaser from him,
that is illegal.
(5) One apparent exception is that where a man has been describing his
goods by his own name, another man having the same name cannot
be prevented from using it, though this may have the effect of
deceiving purchasers.
(6) But this exception does not go far. A man may so use his own name
as to infringe the rule of law. It is a question of evidence in each
case whether there -is false representation or not. So he may be
restrained if he associates another man with him, so that under their
joint names he may pass off goods as the goods of another person...."

Since we are here concerned with trade and personal names, only
paragraphs 5 and 6 are of principal concern, but paragraph 4 is an
example of the test to be applied in these cases. Before leaving this

case it is important to observe that it refers only to "goods", whereas

5Re: Menzies-Gibson, [19551 O.W.N. 657; 23 C.P.R. 87; (1956), 1 D.L.R.

(2d) 187.
6 The Trade Marks Act, 1-2 Eliz. 2, c. 49.

7For a fuller treatment see Canadian Law of Trade Marks, Dr. H. G.
Fox, 2nd ed., Vol. II, pages 721-938 and KerZy on Trade Marks, 7th ed., pages
508-611.
8
Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 54 at p. 79;
13 R.P.C. at 256.
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other cases
indicate that the common law action will also cover
"services" 9 and "business".' 0
Another preliminary point is the difference between a trade
mark and a trade name. The two definitions adopted in The Trade
Marks Act, 1953 are derived from the common law:
Section 2(t)
"trade mark" means
(i) a mark that is used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing
or so as to distinguish wares or servaces manufactured, sold,
leased, hired or performed by him from those manufactured, sold,
leased, hired or performed by others,
Section 2 (u)
"trade name" means the name under which any business Is carried
on, whether or not it is the name of a corporation, a partnership or
an individual.

In this discussion, we are concerned only with trade names but
it is important to observe that these two definitions are not exclusive
of one another, and in many cases it will be found that a trade name
is being used both as the name of a business and also as a trade mark,
and in these circumstances, the trade name is said to acquire "secondary significance"."
In the case of passing off by confusing trade names, the plaintiff
must show at least a likelihood of confusion or deception between his
business and the business of the defendant by reason of trade names,
such that persons doing business with the defendant will believe that
they are doing business with the plaintiff.' 2 In order to show such
confusion, he must first establish that his trade name is prima facie
distinctive of his business though the burden of proof here is lower
than in a trade mark case.' 3 Furthermore, the plaintiff must himself
have acquired the trade name honestly and it must not be one that
is in any way misleading.' 4
It is also important to distinguish between a trade name which
has no relation to the business such as a coined word, on the one
9 Office Cleaning Services Ltd. v. Westminster Window and General
Cleaners Ltd. (1946), 63 R.P.C. 39.
20
Sales Affiliates Ltd. v. Le Jean Ltd. (1947), 64 R.P.C. 103.
11
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog (1882), 8 A.C. 15.
32 Goodwin v. Ivory Soap Co. (1900), 17 R.P.C. 689.
Magnolia Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Syndicate (1900), 17 R.P.C. 477.
Cf-B Manischewitz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Hartstone et al. for the
test under
the Unfair Competition Act. 1932.
' 3Montreal Lithographing Co. Ltd. v. Sabiston (1899), 16 R.P.C. 444.
Stevens v. Bell (1927), 31 O.W.N. 371.
Green v. McIntosh, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 656.
Southern v. Reynolds (1865), 12 L.T.N.S. 75.
14 Brewster Transport v. Rocky Mountain Tours & Transport Co. et al,
(19311 S.C.R. 336.
Shutt v. Sterling Food Markets Ltd., [1933] W.W.R. 219.
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Belkin et al. (1955-56), 17 W.W.R. 86.
15 Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maseton & Murray, [1899] A.C. 326.
Dominion Motors Ltd. v. Gillman et al. 32 C.P.R. 73.
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hand, and a name which is descriptive either of the business or of its
geographical location on the other hand.1 5 Generally speaking, it
may be stated that the burden of proof in the first case is much
lighter than in the second, and indeed where the name is clearly
descriptive of the business it may be virtually impossible for the
plaintiff to prove distinctiveness.' 6
Before confusion, or likelihood of confusion can be established,
it is necessary to show that the plaintiff and the defendant are in the
same class of business such that members of the public could readily
confuse one with the other and this principle is frequently summarized
by stating that the plaintiff and the defendant must be "competitors", though this statement is open to a narrow interpretation1 7
The question of the length of time in which the plaintiff and
defendant respectively have carried on business is of considerable
importance.' s Thus, if the two businesses have been conducted for
a substantial length of time without evidence of confusion, the plaintiff will have a much heavier burden of proof.' 9 Conversely, if the
plaintiff is only recently established, he will be unable to restrain a
defendant, since there will be little to choose between them.20
The Statutory Action2 '
Having stated these basic propositions of the common law of
passing off by trade names, reference may be made to the statutory
action for passing off which incidentally has no counterpart in Great
Britain. Sections 7(b) and (c) of the Trade Marks Act, 1953 provide
as follows:
No person shall ...
(b) direct public attention to his wares, services or business in such a
way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the
time he commenced so to direct attention to them, between his wares,
services or business and the wares, services or business of another;
(c) pass off other wares or services as and for those ordered or requested.
1
6Anglo Canadian Tire Agencies v. Anglo Canadian Underwriters Ltd.
(1942), 16 M.P.R. 198.
Cohen v. Kraus, [19221 1 W.W.R. 703.

"My Valet" v. Winters (1913), 27 O.L.R. 1.
Gramm Motor Truck Co. v. Fisher Motor Co. (1931), 30 O.L.R. 1.
Matthews v. Omansky (1913), 14 D.L.R. 168; 25 W.L.R. 603.
Brookers
v. Collins, [1932] O.R. 189; 2 D.L.R. 139.
17
Macmillan v. Ehrmann Bros. Ltd. (1904), 21 R.P.C. 357.
Anglo Canadian Tire Agencies v. Anglo Canadian Underwriters Ltd.,
supra.
95. Cf.-Philco Corp. of CanadaLtd. v. Bialik, 5 Fox Pat. C. 1 at 139; 5 C.P.R.
1
8Walker v. Alley (1807), 13 Gr. 366; Silkins v. Piper (1869), 15 Gr. 581.
Carey v. Goss (1886), 11 O.R. 619; Robinson v. Bogle (1889), 18 O.R. 387.
Montreal Lithographing Co. v. Sabiston, supra.
Love v. Latimer (1900), 32 O.R. 231.
19Harold Lee (Mantles) Ltd. and Harlee Ltd. v. Harold Harley
(Fashions) Ltd. and Harold Harley (Sales) Ltd., (1954), 71 R.P.C. 57.
20
2 1 Cira et al. v. Karmanoff et al., [19551 O.W.N. 178.
See H. G. Fox, Canadian Laws of Trade Marks, supra, at pages 817819 and 837-S38.
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These provisions are generally understood to enact the common
law of passing off and to give it statutory force and effect though
without making any material changes. 22 The words "direct public
attention" are not restricted to some overt act such as the broadcasting of a "commercial" on radio or television, but in fact include
any means whereby the wares, services or business of one person are
23
distinguished from those of another, whether actively or passively.
The words "likely to cause confusion", appearing in section 7(b)
might be thought to be subject to the interpretation laid down in
section 6, which sets out in some detail the circumstances in which
trade marks and trade names are deemed to be confusing with one
another. Of particular interest is section 6(5) which provides as
follows:
(5) In determining whether trade marks or trade names are confusing,
the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to
all the surrounding circumstances including
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade marks or trade names
and the extent to which they have become known;
(b) the length of time the trade marks or trade names have been
in use;
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature of the trade; and
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade marks or trade
names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
These specific conditions do not exclude the consideration of other
circumstances, but it is interesting to note that the question of competition between the business of the plaintiff and that of the defendant
is omitted.
However, in commenting on this particular point, Dr. H. G.
Fox,24 observes that the provisions of section 6 do not apply to
section 7 since section 6 defines the word "confusing" when used as
an adjective and not the word "confusion" as used in section 7(b).
He goes on to suggest that the question of actual competition between
the plaintiff and defendant is now irrelevant, at least as far as an
action under section 7(b) is concerned. Some doubt is cast upon this
proposition by the decision in Cira v. Karmanoff25 in which an
injunction was refused on the grounds that, inter alia, the plaintiff
and defendant were not in fact competitors.
22

Hart v. Kilroy, 14 Fox Pat. C. 97; 20 C.P.R. 44: 23 C.P.R. 26.
See also B. Manischewitz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Hartstone et al., 13 Fox
Pat. C. 63; 17 C.P.R. 107; [1953] Ex. C.R. 1- for a discussion of the test to
be applied under the Unfair Competition Act 1932, section 11.
Note that: section 11(b) used the words "reasonably apprehended,"
whereas the present section 7(b) of the Trade Marks Act does not, and it Is
assumed that this decision insofar as it is based for the old Statute is no
longer applicable.
23
Dominion Motors Ltd. v. Gillman, et al., supra.
24 H. G. Fox, Canadian Law of Trade Marks, supra, p. 818.
25
Supra.
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While the foregoing remarks deal with the question of trade
names generally, a distinction must be made in the case where the
26
trade name is the personal name of the proprietor of the business.
One of the fundamental rules by which the common law limited
the scope of the passing off action was to the effect that every man
has the inalienable right to carry on business on his own behalf
in his own personal name provided he does so honestly and without
any intention to cause confusion or deception. 27 This has already
been stated in the reference to the PoweZZ v. Birmingham Vinegar
Breweries Case.28 This particular branch of the law contains some
of the most interesting cases both of deliberate deception, and also of
unequivocal honesty, that are to be found anywhere in our law.
However, it is thought that its importance is diminishing under the
influence of business conditions requiring incorporation of businesses,
however small. In these early cases, great attention was paid to the
motives of the defendant and it was of vital importance to ascertain
whether his use of the name was honest or fraudulent. 29 Thus, any
attempt by the defendant to add to or "garnish" his personal name
in any way was usually regarded as an attempt to make it look more
like that of the plaintiff, such additions being known as "badges of
fraud." 30 After a time, what may be called "constructive fraud"
was developed by the courts which stated more or less that if a plaintiff used the name of his business on his goods as a trade mark and
his goods came to be known and commonly dealt with by that name
as a trade mark, then it was not open to a defendant bearing the
same name to set up in business subsequently and assert his right
to use his own name, because in those circumstances, he was presumed
to be acting dishonestly. 31
The Trade Marks Act, 1953 gives statutory force to the right to
use a personal name even when it conflicts with a registered trade
mark, provided that this will not depreciate the value of the goodwill
in the mark, the relevant portions of section 20 stating as follows:
20. The right of the owner of a registered trade mark to its exclusive
use shall be deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its
use under this Act who sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing trade mark or trade name, but
no registration of a trade mark prevents a person from making...
any bona fide use of his personal name as a trade name ...
in such a manner as is not likely to have the effect of depreciating
the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade mark.
26

Turton v. Turton (1889), 42 Ch. D. 128.
Powell
v. Brimingham Vinegar Brewery Co., supra.
27
,JosephRodgers d Son Ltd. v. W. N. Rodgers (1921), 13 R.P.C. 251.
Burgess v. Burgess (1853), 3 DeG. M. & G. 896; 22 L.J. Ch. 675; 43 E.R. 351;
98 R.R. 350.
28
Supra.
29
Holloway v. Holloway (1850), 13 Beav. 209; 51 E.R. 81; 88 R.R. 463.
S.
Chivers & Sons Ltd. v. S. Chivers & Co. Ltd. (1900), 17 R.P.C. 420.
30
B. Herman & Co. Ltd. v. I. Herman, [1939] O.W.N. 15.
Bowes
v. Shea, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 76; (1938-39), 13 M.P.R. 327.
31
John Brinsmead & Sons Ltd. v. Brinsmead (1913), 30 R.P.C. 493.
S. Chivers & Sons Ltd. v. S. Chivers & Co. Ltd., supra.
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The precise effect of this provision has yet to be tested in Court
though it has sometimes been considered. 32 The saving clause in
respect of personal names refers only to the infringement of a registered trade mark and has no application under section 7.33 The
Act contains no other saving clause in this latter case and it is arguable that on a strict interpretation of section 7(b) none is intended.
However, while the point has not been specifically dealt with by the
Courts, the cases do indicate that section 7(b) is merely declaratory
of the common law,34 and it may therefore be interpreted to include
the common law exceptions as to personal names.
The law of passing off both common law and statute, refers to
individuals and to businesses whether incorporated or not. However,
certain further observations may be made in connection with corporations. Thus, where one corporation assumes a name which is calculated to cause deception or confusion with an established business,
whether incorporated or not, an injunction will be granted restraining
the corporation from carrying on business under that name notwithstanding that the grant of the name is under the prerogative, by
letters patent.8 5 The defense that the name is a personal name is
strictly speaking not open to a corporation, since the fundamental
basis of the common law right of an individual to set up in business
under his own personal name is clearly not applicable to the case of
an incorporation of a new business for which any name can be
chosen from "the rich field of the English (and French) language",3 6
at least at the outset. However, where the new corporation is taking
over the established business of an individual this right may apparently be acquired by virtue of an assignment to the corporation of
the business if it has been carried on by the individual under his own
personal name.37 The cases have not dealt with this point at great
length, but it would appear that the business must have enjoyed
substantial goodwill and the transaction must be at arms length and
without any deliberate intention to cause deception or confusion. 38
32

Hart v. Kilroy, supra.

33

Section 7 deals with the subject of unfair competition generally

without reference to registered Trade Marks, whereas sections 19 to 22 deal
with the specific question of the infringement of a registered trade mark.

Cf. Section 9 of the Unfair Competition Act, 1932 which was dropped in the
Trade Marks Act, 1953.
84 See footnote 22 supra.
35
Acme Vacuum Cleaner Co. Ltd. v. Acme Vacuum Cleaner Co. Ltd.,
13 C.P.R. 146; 13 Fox Pat. C. 85.
Canadian National Investors Ltd. v. Canadian National Estates Ltd.,
[1911] 1 W.W.R. 87.
But where the incorporation is by Act of Parliament the Act will not
interfere: Travellers Inc. v. Travellers Life Insurance Co. (1910), 20 Que. K.B.
437.
36 Be Bristol Laboratories Inc. and Ciba Ltd., Supreme Court of South
Africa, Patents Journal Vol. 13, No. 5.
37 Henry

K. Wampole & Co. Ltd. v. Henry B. Wampole 4 Co. Ltd.,

[1925] Ex. C.R. 61.
Waring
& Gillow Ltd. v. "illow & Gillow Ltd. (1910), 33 R.P.C. 173.
38
Lloyd's v. Lloyds (Southampton) Ltd. (1912), 29 R.P.C. 433: Pinet
et Cie. v. Maison Pinet (1897), 14 R.P.C. 933.
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Even under these circumstances, however, it would seem that
there is no real need to permit the new company to incorporate under
the individual's personal name. One reason for this is the inevitable
"garnishing" of the name by the addition of the word "limited",
which is of course compulsory.3 9 It is suggested that one solution
is to incorporate under any unobjectionable name 40and register the
individual's name as a proprietorship of the company.
The remedies which may be obtained against a corporation in a
passing off action are the same as those in any other passing off
action, namely, an injunction, delivery up, damages and costs. 41 It
is not competent to the court in either the common law or the
statutory passing off action to make any order regarding a change in
the company name any more than it could order an individual to
change his name. 42 Requests for other forms of
relief have occa43
sionally been made but have been unsuccessful.
Having outlined the common law and statutory passing off
actions it is to be noted that the test to be applied in either case is
fundamentally the same namely: is the defendant directing public
attention to his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause
or be likely to cause confusion?4 4
The test therefore comprehends an examination of the methods
by which both the plaintiff and defendant are doing business and it
is not limited to a comparison of names alone, or to the isolation of
any other facets of their respective business, since it refers to what
the two parties are actually doing rather than to what either of
them may have registered as a trade mark, or secured as a corporate
name. This is what distinguishes the passing off action, under statute
and common law, from the action for infringement of a registered
trade mark.45 This subject is beyond the scope of this work but
it may be stated briefly that in the case of a registered trade mark
an action may be brought for infringement based essentially on the
trade mark registration itself, rather than on what the plaintiff does
46
with the mark.
This distinction is even more pronounced in the case of an
application to register a trade mark under the Act, which provides
that a trade mark shall not be registered if it is confusing with a
39

Ontario CorporationAct, 1953, ss. 20 and 21.

40 PartnershipRegistrationAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 289.
41 H.
42

43

cases.

G. Fox, Canadian Law of Trade Marks, supra, pages 921-938.
But see Barrat v. Auto Electric etc. and cases dealt with below.
See below under heading "Company Acts Provision" for specific

44This test is based essentially on the wording of section 7(b) of the
Trade
45 Marks Act, 1953.
See Lamber d Butler v. Goodbody (1902), 19 R.P.C. 377 at p. 381 per
Farwell. . "The registration obviates any necessity on the part of the plaintiff
for proving his title to the mark by user."
46pinto v. Badman (1891), 8 R.P.C. 181.
Kitchen Overall &§ Shirt Go. Ltd. v. Elmira Shirt &. Overall Co. Ltd.,
[1937J Ex. C.R. 230.
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prior registered trade mark and permits an opposition to an application by any person interested, based upon confusion with such a prior
registered trade mark, or confusion with the trade name of a business.47 When considering such an opposition, the Registrar of Trade
Marks is governed by section 6(5),48 and the parties do in fact file
evidence on the various headings of the section, and this procedure
is clearly of reasonable simplicity and brevity as compared with a
passing off action.
Incidentally, it is of interest that in applying the test for infringement of a registered trade mark, or for confusion between a registered
trade mark and a mark the subject of a pending application, the
Courts have repeatedly held that the trade marks must be considered
as a whole. 49 It is not permissible, for example, to ignore similar

portions of the marks and compare only the different portions nor
vice versa.
Reference is made to these distinctions between the common law
and statutory rights and remedies because it will be suggested below
that similar distinctions might well be made between the common law
of trade names and the provisions of the relevant statutes dealing
with corporate names in Canada, which will now be examined in
detail.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS RESPECTING CORPORATE NAMES
Section 12 of the Ontario CorporationsAct 1953,50 reads in part
as follows:
(1) a Corporation shall not be given a name (a) that is the same as or
similar to the name of any known corporation, association, partnership, dndividual or business if the use of such name by the corporation would be likely to deceive . . . [subject to certain exceptions
which are not here applicable];
(2) If a corporation through inadvertance or otherwise has been or is
given a name that is objectionable, the Lieutenant-Governor, after
he has given notice to the corporation of his intention so to do, may
direct the issue of supplementary letters patent changing the name
of the corporation to some other name;
(3) Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the giving of a name
under s-s. (1) or the changing or refusing to change a name under
s-s. (2) may, upon at least 7 days notice to the provincial secretary and to such other persons as the Court may direct, apply to the
Court for a review of the matter and the Court may make an order
changing the name of the corporation to such name as it deems
proper or may dismiss the application.

The precursor of this section is to be found in a much more
general form as early as 1860 in Upper Canada, when the legislature
enacted that the corporate name of a company should not be that
47Trade Marks
48
Bupra.
49

Act, 1953, s. 37.

Yarmaska Garments Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [1945] Ex.
C.R. 233.
Freed & Freed Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 14 C.P.R. 19.
B.
Manisechewitz Company of CanadaLimited v. Hartstone at aL, supra.
50
Statute of Ontario, 2 Eliz. 2, c. 19.
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of any other known company or any name liable to be unfairly confounded therewith or otherwise on public grounds objectionable. 51
These provisions were made much more specific by section 9 of The
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1874:52
9.

In case it should be made to appear that any company is incorporated
under the same name or under a name similar to that of an existing
company, it shall be lawful for the Lieutenant-Governor in Council
to direct the issue of Supplementary Letters Patent reciting the
former letters and changing the name of the company to some
other name to be set forth in the Supplementary Letters Patent;
The Court of Chancery may compel an application under this section
whenever a company improperly assumes the name of, or a name
similar to that of an existing company.

It should be noted that the Act failed to indicate who could bring an
action before the Court, in order that it might compel an application
to be made to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council for the issuance of
Supplementary Letters Patent. Furthermore, the Act did not lay down
a test by which "it could be made to appear" that a new company had
been incorporated with a name similar to that of an existing company.
Finally, it must be noted that the Act merely stated that the name
should not be the same as, or similar to, that of an existing company.
The Companies Act of 189753 section 23 amended the provisions of
the 1874 Act by qualifying the phrase "same name as or under a name
similar" by the words "as to deceive" and also by the inclusion within
its application not only of an existing company but also of a partnership, individual, or any existing business. The power of the Court,
after the Judicature Act, and of the High Court, to compel an
application was dropped at the same time, leaving the sole authority
in the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. These provisions have been
substantially re-enacted by successive revisions of the Ontario Statutes
until 1950, although the Act of 190754 did incorporate the provision
concerning a name that was objectionable, while the Act of 1912,
section 3755 amended the words "as to deceive" to "caluclated to
deceive".
Not until 1953 was an explicit provision made in an Ontairo
Statute giving an aggrieved party the right to apply to the Court
for a review of his case, and empowering it to make an order changing
the name of the corporation to such name as it deems proper. By way
of comparison it observed that in Nova Scotia as early as 1912, a
provision was made under the Companies Act 56 giving an aggrieved
company, whose name had been changed by direction of the Registrar,
the right to apply to the Court for an order either restoring its
former name or making such provisions as seemed just for placing the
company and all persons in the same position or as nearly as may
be as if the Registrar's direction had never been given.
51
Statutes of Canada, 1860, 23 Vict., c. 31, s. 1.
52
Statutes of Ontario, 1874, 37 Vict., c. 35, s. 9.
53
Statutes of Ontario, 1897, 60 Vict., c. 28, s. 23.
54 Statutes of Ontario, 1907, 7 Ed. 7, c. 34, s. 28.
55 Statutes of Ontario, 1912, 2 Geo. 5, c. 31, s.37.
56 Nova Scotia Statutes, 1912, 2 Geo. 5, c. 47, s.3B.
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Clearly, even this did not go as far as the present provision of
section 12 of the Ontario Act which permits an application by any
person aggrieved. The statutes of other Provinces, and of the
Dominion, are innocent of any specific provision enabling such an
application, and it must therefore be regarded as something of an
experiment.
On one view, section 12 covers all businesses irrespective of
competition and indeed Dr. H. G. Fox suggests that it applies without
regard to the class of business in which the two companies are
engaged:
"This restriction, therefore, is of much wider extent than that imposed
by the Common Law, which forbids the use of ,dentical, or similar names
only when the businesses concerned are of the same general class or
are so related that the use of the same name will cause the public to
believe that there is a connection or association
between them, or will
cause injury to reputation and goodwill." 57

A variety of cases have arisen, both in Provincial Courts and in
the Exchequer Court, in which the relevant provisions have been
considered and a brief summary of them will now be given, though
unfortunately the point of law for decision in the Chapple case does
not seem to have been dealt with specifically.
Thus in British Columbia Permanent Loan Ltd. v. Wooton
(1898)58 it was held that the discretion of the Registrar under a
corresponding provision of the Investment ,Loan Societies Amend
ment Act, 1898 to register a company name was not conclusive, and
it was therefore open to the Court to grant an injunction for passing
off, restraining use of the name.
An indication of one mode of enforcing this provision was given
in J. Palmer Co. Ltd. v. Palmer-Mc-lelan Shoe Pack Co. Ltd.
(1917)59 which was an action for an injunction under the common
law of passing off and for a declaration that confusion had occurred
and was likely to occur. In refusing to make the declarations Barry
$.held,
"It seems to me that if the plaintiff has any rights dn this matter, It Is
a right of appeal to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council,
under section 22 of the New Brunswick Joint Stock Companies Act for
a change in the corporate name of the defendants ...
',

and he therefore concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction. He
then considered,, assuming the Court did have jurisdiction to make
such a declaration, -whether it was justified in doing so, and the test
he applied was a straightforward comparison of the full names of
each company;
"that is, place the names side by side and test by dnspection of the eye

whether one is likely to be mistaken for or confounded with the other."
57 H. G. Fox, op. cit., p. 852 see also Buckley, The Companies Act, 9th ed.
p. 14.
58 (1898), 6 B.C.R. 382.
59

(1917), 45 N.B.R. 8.
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Another mode of enforcement was attempted, without success,
in the case of Oxweld Acetylene (o, v. Oxweld Co. of Canada,Limited
(1923) ,60 which was an action at common law for passing off and for
an order annuling the Letters Patent of the Company. On appeal, the
injunction was maintained, but the annulment was refused on the
grounds that there was nothing in the Act permitting annulment on
the grounds of confusing names, and any such order must be sought
by the Attorney-General in an ex relator proceeding.
Enforcement ofthis type of section was once again avoided, this
time on a technicality, in the case of In The Matter of The Foreign
Insurance Companies Act, (1932),61 which concerned the construction of Section 9 of that Act which prohibited the registration of a
company with a name the same as a company already registered, or
in the opinion of the Superintendent
"any name liable to be confounded therewith".
A foreign company, The Continental Assurance Co., had been
refused registration in view of the existence of a Canadian company
called Continental Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Unfortunately, no judgment was given on the merits of the case, the Court holding that the,
Act did not in terms apply to the name of a Canadian company and
therefore the registration of the foreign company was allowed.
A provision of the sanie general character as that of Sec. 12.of
the Ontario Corporations Act is found in the Quebec Partnership
Declaration Act 2 which prohibits the registration of a name, style
or firm name similar to one already registered. This provision was
briefly considered in Pinardv. Coderre6 3 but no specific construction
was laid down for its application, the Court granting the injunction
asked on the basis of the Unfair Competition Act, 1932,64 sections 7
and 8.
A more vigorous approach was taken to this type of provision
when the corresponding section of the British Columbia Companies
Act65 was considered in Barratt v. Auto Electric Service (Pacific)
Ltd,6 6 which as far as the statute was concerned apparently held only
that the decision of the Registrar to permit registration did not bar
the Courts from granting an injunction under the Common Law.
However, the Court did grant two injunctions, one restraining further
use of the confusing name, and another, ordering the defendant to
change its name. The jurisdiction for this latter injunction is certainly
not found in the Common Law, and it is assumed that the learned
judge granted it under the Companies Act, possibly relying upon
section 17(3). It is thus of great interest to find a Court willing to
60 (1923), 54 O.L.R. 455.

61 (1934] Ex. C.R. 84.
62 1941 R.S.O., c. 277, s.10 and 13.
63 (1954), 20 C.P.R. 19; 13 Fox Pat. C. 77.
64 Statutes of Canada, 1932, 22-23 Geo. 5, c. 38, s. 7, s. '8.
65 R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 58, s.17.
66 (1954), 21 C.P.R. 30; 14 Fox Pat. C. 143.
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give real force and effect to the Corporate Name provisions in a
Companies Act, apparently for the first time.
In Bewley v. Secretary of State67 the President of the Exchequer
Court dismissed an application under the general provisions of section 29(c) of the Exchequer Court Act for an order compelling the
Secretary of State to change the name of the company. Details of
his reason for judgment are not available.
Enforcement of these provisions was once again evaded in the
case of Re Universal Asbestos Cement Ltd. and Supercrete Ltd.68
which was an application by the U.A.C. Ltd. for a writ of prohibition
from the Manitoba Queen's Bench to prevent the Provincial Secretary from reconsidering the issue of Letters Patent of Incorporation
69
to the U.A.C. Ltd. under section 10 of the Manitoba Companies Act.
70
In the course of his judgment, Campbell J. held that:
"judicial decisions dealing with disputes as to the use of trade names
and decisions under the Unfair Competition Act have no relevance to
the present application",
a finding which was apparently ignored in the Re Chapple Case, and
one which, it is submitted has much to support it. He then refused
the writ of prohibition on the basis that the Minister had a discretion
under the Act, the exercise of which did not determine the existence
of rights as between two companies, and that he would not interfere
with such a discretionary act for this reason.
The present Ontario Act was apparently considered for the first
time in the case of Re Menzies-Gibson Ltd.71 in which the Provincial
Secretary had permitted a company to change its own name to "Menzies-Gibson Ltd". An individual named Menzie Gibson then objected
under section 12(2) of the Ontario CorporationsAct, 1953 and the
Registrar changed the name to "Menzies and Gibson Ltd". The
Company then applied to the Court under section 12 (3) for an order
changing its name back to the earlier form. The Court held that the
change made by the Provincial Secretary under section 12(2) was
wrong, apparently on the basis that the names were not calculated to
deceive. In the course of his judgment McRuer C.J.H.C. observed
that:
"He (Mr. M. Gibson) is not in any sense in a competitive market in his
own personal right and even if he were I would hesitate to say there
was a connection..."
In another unreported decision Re AtZin-Ruffner Mines (B.C.)
Ltd. and Atlin Nickel Mines Ltd.,7 2 the facts were essentially that
A.-R.M. was a British Columbia Company of considerable reputation
and quoted on the Stock Exchange as "Atlin-Ruffner".
67

R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 58, s. 17(1).

(1959), 31 C.P.R. 102.
69 1954 R.S.M. 1954, c. 43, s. 10.
70 31 C.P.R. 102 at 111. "
71 [1955] O.W.N. 657; 23 C.P.R. 87.
72 1957 (June) S.C.O., docket 676.
68
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A.N.M. was an Ontario Company incorporated in 1957, and
later in the same year it was certified in British Columbia as an Extra-Provincial Company, A.-R.M. then objected under section 12(2)
of the Ontario Corporation Act and the Provincial Secretary appointed
a hearing at which he ordered A.N.M. to change its name.
A.N.M. then applied to the Court under section 12(3) for an
an order allowing it to keep its name and the Court so held, no reasons for the decision appearing on the record.
It is to be noted that the last two cases both give a rather narrow
interpretation to the section and one, in effect, generous to the newly
registered company which is resisting the change.
Turning now to the corresponding provisions of the British
Companies legislation, the Companies Act, 186273 section 20 provided
as follows:
20. No company shall be registered under a name identical with that by
which a subsisting company is already registered or nearly so resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive . . . and if any
company through inadvertance or otherwise is . . . registered by
name identical with that by which the subsisting company is registered or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to
deceive such first mentioned company may with the sanction of the
registrar change the name ....
This provision was maintained in successive Companies Acts
without significant changes until the Companies Act (1948) 7 4 when
its form was substantially revised as follows:
Section 17. No Company shall be registered by a name which in the
opinion of the Board of Trade is objectionable.
section 18(2). If through inadvertance or otherwise a company is
registered by a name which, in the opinion of the Board of Trade is
too like the name by which a company in existence is previously registered, the first mentioned company may change its name ....
Under the 1862 Act and its successors there have been few cases
which sought to rely on its provisions and a larger number in which
they were referred to in passing, but no case seems to have actually
granted any relief under these provisions, and it is pertinent to
examine them more closely.
Thus, the 1862 Act stipulated that no company should be registered with a name that is similar to that of a subsisting company,
but there appears to have been neither a tribunal designated to
receive applications nor a remedy to restrain its breach. Whether an
application was to have been heard at all, whether by the Court or
by the Registrar, is uncertain, although it would seem that an application to the latter, at least in the first instance, would have been more
appropriate. Whether this was the only method of applying, however,
is by no means clear. Assuming that there was to have been a competent tribunal to hear an application, the Act gave no indication as
to whether the appropriate remedy was an injunction restraining the
73 Public General Statutes, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89, s. 20 [U.K.].

74 Public General Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 [U.K.].
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use of the name, or an award of damages, or an order merely changing the name. Clearly if the Registrar was intended to hear applications under the section at first instance, the first two remedies would
have been excluded. Finally, section 20 apparently did not give a right
of action to any specific person, firm, or corporation, although the
reference to a "subsisting company" is some indication that, if anyone was to have such a right, it was that company. On this last point
there is authority at least for the negative proposition that a company which was not incorporated under the Act of 1862 had no right
75

'to enforce section

20,

There 'isalso authority for the point that the section did not
apply as between two companies both of which were already registered under its provisions since the prohibitory words in the sec'tion werestated in the future.tense.7 6 This type of judicial amendment
of stafutory provisions is by no means uncommon, but it is regrettable to find such an evasion of the spirit
of the statute being prac7
tised by such a noted jurist as Jessel M.R
At most therefore, the section could have applied only as between one registered company and another company seeking registration, a situation which would seldom come to the notice of the
older company at such an early stage.
It is submitted, however, that under the general rules of statutory interpretation there were grounds for an application to the
Court in the latter situations. Thus, it was said in an early case:
"if a statutory obligation is created but no mode of enforcing its performance is ordained, the common law in general finds a mode suited
to the particular nature of the case.Ts"
Similarly,' in a more recent case the same proposition was stated
thus:
"Primafacie a -person; who has been injured by the breach of a statute
has the right to recover damages from the person committing It unless
it can be established
by considering the whole of the Act that no such
right was intended.7 9 "
Applying these principles to section 20, there were adequate grounds
to support an application by the "subsisting company" to the Court
for an injunction restraining the incorporation of another company
in the name identical to, or so nearly resembling its name, as to be
calculatedto deceive, the Court being the common law tribunal and
the injunction being the common law remedy.
75

Hendricks u. Montague (1881), 17 Ch. D. 638.
76Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Merchants Joint Stock Bank

(1878), 9 Ch. D. 560.

Ouvak Ceylon Estates Ltd. v. Uva Ceylon Rubber Estates Ltd. (1910), 27
R.P.C.
7 7 753.
Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Merchants Joint Stock Bank,
suvr'a.
78
Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges (1831), 1 Barn. & Ald. 847; 35
R.R.79483.
Monk 'v. Warbey, [19353 1 K.B. 75.
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This in fact occurred in the case of Aerators Ltd. v. Tollit et aZ.,8o
which was an action against the promoters of a proposed company,
seeking an injunction under section 20 to restrain them from incorporating under the name "Automatic Aerator Patents Ltd". Farwell J. refused to grant the injunction on the grounds that there was
no likelihood of deception between "Aerators Ltd." and, "Automatic
Aerator Patents Ltd". His finding was based upon the fact that
"aerator" was a word which was used to describe a certain type of
apparatus and as such it was not open to the plaintiffs to claim broad
rights in it as a trade name, and in fact it would only be able to restrain the adoption of a virtually identical name. l Apparently, there
has only been one other case in the English Courts of a serious attempt to enforce the statutory provisions and that occurred in Daimler Motor Car Company Ltd. v. British Motor Traction Company
Ltd.8 2 This was an action to restrain the promoters of a proposed
company from incorporating under a certain name, the actions being
based upon section 20 and on the common law. Buckley J., as he then
was, refused to grant the injunction on the basis that the plaintiff's
name was not distinctive of their business, but was used by a number
of different manufacturers to describe their cars, apparently without
objection.
In a more recent case, the corresponding provisions of the laws
of Nigeria were considered by the Privy Council in the case of Lagos
Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated) v. Registrar of Companies
83
and Association of Merchants and Industrialists.
The Privy Council
found that there was no likelihood of deception between the two
Chambers of Commerce and registration of the second was therefore
allowed. It is not entirely clear from the report whether their Lordships consciously intended to distinguish in principle between the
construction of the section, and the basis of the common law passing
off action. Throughout the judgment, stress is laid upon the differences between their names, and no reference is made to passing off
principles, or to passing off cases in any detail, and it would seem that
their Lordships merely sought to apply the section without engrafting a construction upon it by the study of common law cases, the
following passage being exemplary;84
"Their Lordships are not, however, satisfied that when the two names
are contrasted having regard to all the surrounding circumstances there
is such a likelihood of deception as to make it right that the injunction
should be granted."
There have also been attempts to make use of the section in other
ways. Thus, in the case of Rex v. Registrarof Companies,8 5 the Court
considered whether it could interfere by way of Mandamus, in the
80 [19023 2 Ch. 319; 19 R.P.C. 418.

81 Supra at p. 324.
82 (1901), 13 R.P.C. 465.
83 (1955), 72 R.P.C. 263.
84 Supra, at p. 265.
85 [19123 3 K.B. 23; 81 L.J.R. 914.
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refusal by the Registrar to register the name of the company under
the Companies Act, 190786 section 8 (corresponding to section 20 of
the 1862 Act). The Registrar had in fact refused to register the name
of the company under the authority vested in him by section 8, on
the grounds that the name so nearly resembled that of the company
already registered as to be calculated to deceive. In rejecting this
application, Avory J. made the following comments:
"The moment it is admitted that the Registrar must exercise some discretion as to the registration of a company ... I think that in order to
displace the decision of the Registrar and to justify this Court in Interfering by Mandamus the applicant must show one or more of three
things; either that the Registrar has not in fact exercised his discretion
in the particular case, or that he had exercised dt on some wrong
material
principle of law or that he had been influenced
8 7 by extraneous
which he ought not to have taken into account.

Mandamus was therefore refused.
However, under section 8 the Registrar had no power to refuse
a name on any grounds other than similarity with an existing registered name.8 8
Apa rt from these cases which turned specifically on the application of the Companies Act provision, there have been many common
law passing off cases in which some reference has been made to this
provision, while the cases themselves are authority only for the
question of passing off.
Thus in Hendricks v. Montaque8 9 a case of common law passing
off, it was observed that section 20 of the Companies Act, 1862 did
not apply as between an old established unregistered company and a
newly established and newly registered company, and the court proceeded to grant an injunction restraining passing off, in the usual
form.

Further light was thrown on the effect of section 20 of the
Companies Act, 1862 in the case of Merchant Banking Company of
London v. Merchant Joint Stock Bank.90 This was a motion for an
injunction based on the law of passing off. Counsel for the defendant
argued that since the Registrar had not seen fit to object to its name
under section 20, at the time of incorporation, it could not now be
considered objectionable. The Master of the Rolls dismissed this contention and observed that while section 20 was of much broader
scope than the common law, since it prohibited similar names without
reference to competition between business, it only applied before
86 7 Ed. 7, c. 34.
87
[19121 3 K.B. 23 at p. 34.
88

See R. (Rowell) v. Register of Joint Stock Companies for Ireland
(1904), 38, Irish Law Times 136, Rex v. Registrar of Companies, Ex parte
Bowen, [1914] 3 K.B. 161.
89 (1881), 17 Ch. D. 638 and see North Cheshire & Manchester Brewery
Ltd. v. Manchester Brewery Ltd., [1898] 1 Ch. 549; [1899] A.C. 83 for an
observation. Section 20 did not apply in the circumstances of that case.
90 (1878), 9 Ch.D. 560.
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incorporation. Once incorporated the section was no longer applicable
and the common law applied as between any two businesses.
It is to be noted that under the common law of passing off the
Court was not restricted to merely restraining a defendant from carrying on business under a certain name, and the Courts have on
occasion issued an injunction restraining a company from remaining
on the register under a particular name.91
The problem of the construction of the corporate name provision
of other Companies Acts has arisen in other parts of the Commonwealth. Thus in the Union of South Africa, in Union Steel etc. v.
Companies Registrar2 it was apparently held that the principles applicable to the words "calculated to deceive" in section 10 of Act 31
of 1909 are substantially the same as those applicable in passing off
cases.
In New Zealand, the relevant provision was considered in Re Cuff
and Thompson Ltd.93 in which an application for a change of name
was opposed by a company having a similar name, and it was held
that the names were not confusing in the circumstances, there being
no monopoly in a descriptive term.
The foregoing cases have been reviewed in some detail because,
with the exception of the South African case, they avoid laying down
the test to be applied in the application of the words "calculated to
deceive", "similar to", "confound therewith" or any other form, used
in a variety of statutes. In this situation, it is necessary to make a
study of the decisions to see what the Court has actually done in each
case, and attempt to deduce a common principle from them.
It is suggested that in the majority of cases the principle has been
to merely compare the two company names as they stand, and to determine whether or not a reasonable man would be likely to be deceived. Due regard should be given to the question of whether the
two companies are in related businesses,94 and whether the first
company name is either descriptive of the business, or is a geographic
name, on the one hand, or whether it is a "fancy" name on the other
95
hand, the latter being entitled to broader protection than the former.
It is submitted, however, that evidence as to such questions as
the actual way in which each company carries on in business, and
garnishes its name or alters it, is strictly speaking not relevant to an
application under the statute.96 Nor is it relevant to prove that the
Corporate name is actually distinctive, as in the passing off action.97
91
Panhard et Levassor v. Panhard-LevassorMotor Co. Ltd., [19011 2
Ch. 513; 18 R.P.C. 405.
92 [19201 T.P.D. 266.

93 [19331 N.Z.L.R. 50.
94

Be Menzies-Gibson, supra,footnote 5.
Aerators Ltd. v. Toflit, supra and cases in note 15 and 16.
6Be The F. P. ChappZe Co. Ltd., supra,per Stewart, J.

9
9 5 Cf.

97 Ibid.
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If some distinction of principle is required to justify these conclusions it is suggested that the passing off action at common law is
essentially concerned with what the parties are actually doing, whereas the Companies Act provisions are concerned with a system of registration of names, a distinction which is closely analogous to that between the common law passing off action and the system of registration of trade marks already adverted to.
A review of a selection of American cases dealing with statutory
provisions regarding corporate names appears to confirm these conclusions.
In Cranford v. Jordan98 the Secretary of State had refused to
register a confusing corporate name and on application, the court
held that actual confusion was unnecessary. The true test being that
laid down in the earlier case of Rinford et aZ. v. Jordan:99
"[Did] the two names so closely resemble each other that a person using
that care, caution and observation which the public uses and may be expected to use, would mistake one for the other?"
It was held in the case of Drugs Consolidated Inc. v. Drug Incorporated,00 that the only question with which the Court should
concern itself is whether or not the name of the defendant is sufficiently distinguishable from that of the complainant to satisfy the
statute. The Chancellor stated:
"Examining these two names, I am confined to a mere dinspection and
pronouncing of them for a discovery of their distinguishableness."
The same line of reasoning was followed in the subsequent case of
Delaware Charter Co. v. Delaware CharterGo.' 0 It should be noted,
that the statute under which these actions were brought, incorporated a proviso dealing with similar businesses. The relevant section
read in part as follows:
"[the name] shall be such as to distinguish it from any other corporation engaged in the same business or promoting or carrying on the same
objects or purposes".
-thus being specifically limited to business in competition.
In the case of State ex rel. Cohen et. al. v. Hinkle, 02 the Court
held that the names "Carnation Ice Cream Company" and "Carnation Milk Products Company", instead of being exactly alike, only
resembled each other with a difference,
"to such an extent as to furnish room for honest difference of opinion
as to whether they so resemble each other as to be misleading."
By way of contrast a different approach was adopted in B. Forman Company v. Forman Manufacturing Company Inc., 03 which
98 61 Pac. Rep. (2nd) 45 (1936).
99

6 Pac. Rep. (2d) 962 (1932).
101144 Atlantic Rep. 659 (1929).
102 247 Pacific Rep. 1029 (1926).
103 (1923), 119 Miscell. Rep. New York 87.
100 144 Altantic Rep. 656 (1929).
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was a passing off case in which the facts resembled rather closely
those of the Chapple case. The plaintiff since 1912 had been engaged
in the sale of women's apparel and furs. They had become well known
in Rochester, N.Y. by virtue of their extensive advertising displays
and "sales". The defendants in 1922 set up a similar business nearby,
and had placed on their sign the words "Forman" and "Co." in dominant letters, leaving the words "Mfg." and "Inc." relatively inconspicuous. The names of both parties had been derived from the names
of their respective founders. In referring to General Corporation Law
section 6, which forbade the filing of a certificate of incorporation of
a proposed corporation which would have a name so nearly resembling an existing one as to be calculated to deceive, the court held:
"If each act characterizing the defendant's conduct be detached from all
the others it might not be condemned. Its corporate name may be lawfully chosen ... it may put up a sign of the kind it put up ... and yet
its night to operate would not be restricted except as it has elected to
launch its avowed enterprise, shoulder to shoulder with the plaintiff's
establishment. This culminating act in connection with the other is consonant neither with business 04ethics nor with equitable principles of which
the courts take cognizance."1

Thus the court apparently felt the name was unobjectionable as
far as the statute alone was concerned, but that its use under all the
circumstances should be restrained under the law of passing off, a
finding which in this submission would have been appropriate had
the Re Chapple case proceeded in passing off.
CONCLUSION
1) It is submitted that the Chapple case in the Court of Appeal
was founded upon a wrong construction of section 12 (1) of the CorporationsAct, 1953. While the precise form of words suggested as the
true test to be applied is not of vital concern, it is suggested that the
test applied by Stewart J. in the Court of first instance is preferable
to that adopted by the Court of Appeal.
Stewart J. held that the words of the section merely required him
to place the full corporate names side by side and compare them. If,
in his view, the use of the two names was likely to deceive then he
should order a change of name, and conversely, if there was no likelihood of deception, then he should allow the company to retain the
name. No evidence was required beyond the proof of incorporation
under the names in question, and all evidence of the manner in which
the names of both companies were used under different circumstances,
was irrelevant.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with this test, and adopted the
tests put forth by counsel for the applicant as follows:
"Does the word "Chapple" in The F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd. with reference
to a new department store business, make that name one which is so
similar to the name "Chapples Ltd.", a long established operator of a
104 Ibid. at p.

91.
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department store, that the use
of the name "The F. P. Chapple Co. Ltd."
would be likely to deceive?" 105
It will be seen that this test requires the court to pick out the
primary feature of each name, and disregard the ancillary features, a
practice which is condemned in a number of trade mark decisions. 10 6
Having laid down this test, however, the Court of Appeal went on to
examine a variety of affidavit and pictorial evidence of the manner
in which the company names were actually used by both parties and
also as to instances of actual confusion. In rejecting the submission
of counsel for the respondent that such evidence was immaterial,
Porter C.J.O. said as follows:
"I think that the actual manner of use is relevant, and in this case of
considerable weight in showing how the two names readily lend themselves to a use which would likely deceive. I have no doubt that the
manner of use would inevitably lead to confusion. Further, in my view,
the respondent's company name in itself, as applied to a department
store business, on the face of it, would be likely to cause confusion and to
deceive."10 7
It is to be noted that this passage indicates that the learned Chief
Justice was in fact considering how the names of both companies
"lend themselves" to deception. This question is not covered by section 12 which refers specifically to the name of the corporation, and
not to any adaptation or abbreviation of it. It is therefore submitted
that it is not open to the court to consider any possible abbreviations
which may be practised by the companies and evidence of such abbreviations and the confusion caused by them is strictly speaking, irrelevant to an application under the section. However, it is clear from
the passage cited above that the learned Chief Justice did not rely
only upon the abbreviated forms of the company names, but he went
on to hold that the name of the respondent "in itself" (i.e. the full
name) would be likely to deceive. This latter finding is of course directly contrary to the finding of Stewart J. in the court below, and in
fact the judgment of the Court of Appeal can be supported on this
basis alone. This is essentially a question of fact and is hence often
open to a difference of opinion.
Before leaving this point, it is noteworthy that Stewart J. based
his judgment upon his construction of section 12, without the assistance of any cases specifically turning on the construction of a similar statutory provision.1 08 The Court of Appeal laid down its test for
applying the section based, apparently, upon the basis of a number of
common law passing off cases, none of which turned upon the construction of a statutory provision comparable to section 12, though
some of these cases contain certain passages indicating that such provisions are not applicable to passing off actions.
Neither court dealt with the considerable body of Canadian precedent dealing specifically with corresponding provisions in other Prov105 [19603 O.R. at page 538.

106 See note 49, supra.

107 [19601 O.R. at page 540.
1os

(1960), 33 C.P.R. at page 50.
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inces, nor the one Privy Council decision dealing with a corresponding provision in the laws of Nigeria. Accordingly it is suggested that
the construction of section 12(1) is still open to interpretation de
novo.
2) Having before us two alternative constructions of section 12,
it is relevant to consider some of the possible results flowing from
either of them. Thus, the construction adopted by Stewart J. involves
only a brief application to the court with a minimum of evidence and
involving the parties in only modest costs. The common law passing
off action is one of the most expensive forms of litigation known to
the courts and for this reason the trade marks legislation was introduced throughout the common law countries with a view to rendering
it possible to bring an action under the statute without the necessity
of proving all the points raised in a passing off action. The approach
of Stewart J. to section 12 seems to be characterized by a similar
desire to prevent an application under the section from developing
into a full scale passing off action based on affidavit as opposed to
viva voce evidence and instead to keep it as simple and expeditious
as is compatible with the requirements of a fair hearing. By contrast,
the Court of Appeal, by treating all the evidence filed as being relevant
to the application, has rendered it necessary for parties to such
applications, virtually speaking, to develop all the evidence required
for a passing off action, and this without any possibility of obtaining
the effective relief which the common law provides. It would seem
that if this tendency is developed in future cases then applications
under section 12 will become a rarity. Few litigants will be able to
afford them, and those who can, will prefer to secure a perpetual
injunction under the common law rather than a change of name under
the statute.
3) The difference between the relief obtained at common law
on the one hand and under section 12 on the other is of vital importance. Under the common law a successful plaintiff is granted a
perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from using the name
complained of, or any other name so nearly resembling the same as
to be calculated to deceive, or from otherwise passing off and enabling
others to pass off his goods as and for those of the plaintiff, delivery
up of goods bearing the matter complained of, and damages. Under
section 12 a successful applicant will merely obtain an order that
the name of the respondent company be changed.
The order changing the name, unlike an injunction, does not
prevent the respondent company from continuing in business under
the same name. Accordingly, it is open to the respondent to carry on
business in precisely the same way as before, merely dropping the
word "limited" from the end of his company name. When trading
in this way the respondent should obviously comply with the Partnership Registration Act o9 and register his old company name as a
2o9 Supra.
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trading style of the corporation, and there is nothing in the Partnership Registration Act as it stands to prevent him from doing so. If
the respondent should do this, the applicant company will then have
to resort to a passing off action in order to obtain an injunction,
enforceable if necessary by contempt proceeding,11 0 thus being put
to the same expense a second time. In practice, few respondent
companies would wish to get involved in a passing off action, having
lost an application under section 12, but the fact remains that this
situation could arise.
4) Section 12 of the Ontario CorporationsAct, 1953 has now
been the subject of considerable scrutiny by the courts and it is
relevant to consider whether, and if so what, amendments or changes
might be of assistance with a view to improving its effect, provided
its general framework is considered acceptable.,
A complementary
provision similar to section 12 might be inserted into the Partnership
Registration Act. This would close the loophole which is at present
open to respondent companies who are unsuccessful in resisting a
section 12 application. At the same time, somewhat stiffer penalties
might be provided in the Partnership Registration Act to give its
provisions greater force and effect.
Legislation in the Union of South Africa has already gone
beyond the reach of this suggestion and that of the present Ontario
CorporationsAct, 1953. The Business Names Act, 1960n2 has introduced for the first time in South Africa the provision whereby the
Registrar of Companies at the instance of a person aggrieved "may
order a person to cease carrying on a business" under a trading name
which in the opinion of the Registrar is, "calculated to deceive or to
mislead the public or to cause annoyance or offence to any person
or class of persons or is suggestive of blasphemy or indecency". This
provision would probably be incompatible with the British North
America Act since it would give judicial powers to the Registrar, but
some less sweeping provision would be sufficient. It is also of interest
that while the Ontario Partnership Registration Act contains no
such provision, the Quebec Partnership DeclarationAct" 3 contains
a provision prohibiting registration of similar names.
5) Finally the jurisdiction question may be mentioned briefly.
If the Chapples test is to be applied in future by the courts then it
should also be applied by the Provincial Secretary. This will place
the Secretary in the position of considering large volumes of evidence
110 StandardIndustriesLtd. v. Rosen (1954), 24 C.P.R. 41.
31 For example, each province, and the Dominion, maintains a separate
register of Company names. A registration on one does not avoid conflict
with another register so that policing of an established name involves a
scrutiny of each one. A name may be struck off without any limitation as to
time which compares unfavourably with The Trade Marks Act (supra), under
which an "opposition period" of one month is provided. These are merely
suggestions for improvement however, and the general principle is a welcome
addition to the Statute.
112 Business Names Act, 1960, No. 27 of 1960, Union of South Africa.
113 Supra.
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tending to show passing off and, in addition, of studying the large
numbers of decisions in Great Britain and this country on the many
different aspects of this branch of the law. It is submitted that such
considerations are essentially judicial matters and as such they are
not competent to the Secretary, under the terms of the British North
America Act.n 4

fl4

Statutes of Canada, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3.

